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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TIME COMMERCIAL FINANCING CORP., 
a Utah. corporation, 
Plaintiff~Appellant, 
vs, 
CAROL BRIMHALL, WILLIAM HESTERMAN, 
STEPHEN D. SCHULTZ and BRIMHALL 
PRODUCT~, INC., a corporation, and 
4-.SPECTRA, INC., 
Defendants-Respondents, 
and 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
Administrator with. tfl.e Will annexed 
of the Estate of Ray s. Brimli.all, 
deceased, 
Defendant-Respondent 
and Th.ird-.party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIMCO HYDRAULICS & ENGINEERIN~1 INC., 
a corporation, JOHN B. FAIRBAN~fuJR., 
and WESTERN RESEARCH AND MANUFAC RING 
COMPANY, 
Th.ird•Party Defendants-. 
Respondents, 
Case )fa 
RESPONSE. TO APPELLANT•S RHPL'Y' BJ:fE'P 
BY' DRFENDA;NtS-.RESPONDENTS CAROL 
BR!MHALL DAVIS ANlJ wxx:m mr 
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APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF THE THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, DATED APRIL 11, 1977, 
BY THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, DISTRICT JUDGE. 
Thous J. Rossa 
David v. Trask 
Trask & Britt 
345 South State Street, Suite 105 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1922 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents Carol Brimhall 
Davis, Walker Bank & Trust 
Company and Brimhall Product~, Inc. 
Philip A. Mallinckrodt 
Robert R. Mallinckrodt 
Mallinckrodt & Mallinckrodt 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-1624 
A. Wally Sandack 
Sandack & Sandack 
370 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-0555 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
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RESPONSE REQUIRED 
The defendants-respondents Carol Brimhall Davis (herein-
after "Davis") and Walker Bank & Trust Company, Administrator 
with the Will annexed of the Estate of Ray S, Brimhall, deceased 
(hereinafter "Walker Bank"), respectfully submit this response 
to Appellant's Reply Brief. A response to that brief is regarded 
as necessary in view of improper, unsupportable and misdirected 
argument therein presented and in view of a recent trial court 
pronouncement which bears directly on the issues before this 
Court in this appeal, 
THE ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL 
This appeal arises from a post-judgment proceeding 
in which the trial court held that a particular product (a "Black 
Cab Latch") is a royalty bearing product (R-754) under and pur-
suant to the final Amended Decree of July 30, 1975 (R-624), 
The plaintiff-appellant Time Commercial Financing Corporation 
(hereinafter "TIMECO") claims that it was denied due process 
in the proceedings immediately precedent to that holding. In 
turn TIMECO seeks reversal of that holding and a "remand to the 
lower court to consider additional evidence" (TIMECO's Brief, 
page 2). The defendants-respondents Davis and Walker Bank urge 
that the appeal is not perfected and that TIMECO was not denied 
due process. 
THE APPEAL IS HOT PERFECTED 
The defendants-respondents Davis and Walker Bank assert 
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that the appeal is not perfected on several 3rounds as set 
in their Brief. TIMECO disagrees by asserting distinction, 
without substance. 
Notice of Appeal 
Fatally Defective 
In their main Brief (page 7), Davis and Walker Bani. 
argue that the Notice of Appeal is fatally defective because 
it takes appeal from the trial court Order of April 11, ig--
(R~798) which denied TIMECO's Motion For Review And ll'ithdra·o1a 
Of Memorandum Decision of January 31, 1977 (R-755) rather thi·' 
from the substantive trial court decision of January 2-l, ig·· 
(R-754) of which TIMECO complains. 
TIMECO challenges the position of Davis and Walker 
Bank on the grounds that TIMECO's motion of January 31, 19~" 
(R-755) was not a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 as Da'.. 
and Walker Bank argue, Rather, TIMECO asserts that its moti:· 
of January 31, 1977 was "in substance and effect .... ,a motior. 
I 
to alter or amend the Judgment of January 24, 1977, as proricil 
I 
for by Rule 59(e).,." (Reply Brief, page 4), The distinctior 
is without material difference, It does not make the Notice 
of Appeal any less defective, A motion to alter or amend a 
judgment is also not appealable. Th.e case of Walker v. Banh 
of America National Trust & Savings Association, 268 F,2cl l'. 
! 
(CCA 9th., 1959), cert, den., 361 U.S. 903, 80 S.Ct. 211, .\ l, I 
2d 158 (1959) so holds except w!Lere the order denving the i:: 
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is challenged as a manifest abuse of discretion, However, TIMECO 
has not here presented such a challenge, 
Appeal Untimely 
Defendants-respondents Davis and Walker Bank argue 
that the appeal presented hy TIMECO is not timely on the basis 
that the Motion For Review And Withdrawal Of Memorandum Decision 
filed by TIMECO on January 31, 19 77 (R-755) was not a motion 
for a new trial under Rule 59. In its Reply Brief at page 7, 
TIMECO responds by characterizing the January 31, 1977 motion 
as a motion to alter or amend a judgment (i,e., the Order of 
January 24, 1977). The distinction is meaningless. 
Davis and Walker Bank assert that TIMECO's motion of 
January 31, 1977 was a motion for reconsideration prohibited 
under the doctrine expressed by this Court in Drury v. Lunceford, 
18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (1966), In the post-trial and 
post-judgment environment of the instant case, the purpose of 
a motion of the kind submitted by TIMECO could only be to seek 
reconsideration, No new trial could be had since the trial was 
completed in 1972. No alteration of a judgment could be made 
because the judgment at issue is the Amended Decree of July 30, 
1975 (R-624) which was clearly~ judicata. The memorandum 
decision or Minute Order of January 24, 1977 (_R-755} by which 
the trial court reasserted the meaning of the July 30, 1975 
Judgment was being challenged by TIMECO. A motion for a new 
trial or to alter or amend under Rule 59 was not then claimed 
- 3-
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and does not col'lport with the factual and procedural enn 
ment. 
Nevertheless, TD!ECO aggressively asserts the r~oL 
of January 31, 19 77 was under Rule 59 (e). Such an asscrtio:: 
is without foundation for reasons as set forth on pages 11-L 
of the Brief of Davis and Walker Bank and for the reason tha: 
the motion did not seek to alter or amend anything, :io errc: 
either legal, grammatical or otherwise was claimed to exist:· 
any judgment or order. Rather, TIMECO's motion of Januarv : .. 
1977, if anything, sought reconsideration on the basis that: 
trial court should take additional evidence. Accordingly, t~.: '. 
January 31, 1977 motion could not have been under Rule 59(eJ i 
in substance or in effect. Therefore, the motion did not to: I 
the appeal period; and the appeal is untimely. 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS 
The "Black Cab Latch", which is the centerpoint o: ! I 
dispute, is not a new product. THIECO didn't k . . I start ma mg 1. 
or selling it last week or even last year. It was being maJr 
and sold long before the Amended Decree of July 30, 19 75 (R·:. 
was entered. The trial court knew of the existence of the'':. 
Cab Latch" by testimony presented as early as June 12, 19"' 
(R-217). Indeed, much testimony is of record presenting ~~~· 
1
/ 
and details pertinent to the "Black Cab Latch" (R-2:ci, R-.:-. I 
R-220), Accordingly, the trial court was quite familiar 111 : I 
the accused product when it was brought before the court 
-.i-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
December 22, 1977. The court was there asked to decide whether 
or not the "Black Cab Latch" was intended to be within or without 
the scope of its Arnendeu Decree of July 30, 1975. It certainly 
could decide that question without any evidence because the trial 
court was in effect and in fact simply reasserting and restating 
the scope and intent of its Amended Decree of July 30, 1975, 
At a recent hearing in the trial court before the Honorable James 
S. Sawaya, the trial court said with respect to the question 
of TIMECO's liability for royalties on the "Black Cab Latch" 
and the findings now on appeal to this Court: 
"I have found as a matter of fact, a matter that 
I submit is subject to review of the Supreme Court 
because you (_TIMECO) have made that on issue on appeal, 
that the black cab latch is sufficientlr identical 
with the original cab latch that royalties should 
be paid on it, .••.• L said you have got a license by 
reason of succession because you (_TI~ffiCO) foreclosed 
and nobody really took issue with my findings on that. 
You (TI~ffiCO) paid royalties until you (TI~ffiCO) started 
manufacturing a cab latch that was in my mind suf-
ficiently identical that you (TIMECO) should be paying 
royalties on that as well pursuant to the Court's 
Order. t found that and frankly I think it was an 
atteni t to change the thing in some minute minor 
etail so t at you 1E 0 wou n t ave to pay royal-
ties and I don't think that that's---I don't think 
that's fair quite frankly,. •. " Extracted from tran-
script of proceedings before the Hon~rable James s. 
Sawaya on September 23, 1977 (emphasis added), 
Based on the above statement, it can be seen that the 
trial court was familiar with the "Black Cab Latch" and properly 
ruled that it was a royalty bearing product within the scope 
of its Amended Decree of July 30, 1975. No due process violation 
is extant" 
-5-
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IMPROPER ARGUJ,!ENT 
In its Reply Brief, TIMECO presents argument whic:. 
is improper, unsupportable or misdirected" Brief response t':. 
is made below. 
Nordell-Kimball Patent 
Not of Record 
On page 10, at line 11 of its Reply Brief, TH!ECO 
admits that it withdrew the Nordell-Kimball patent from the 
record. In other words, that patent is not of record an<l i; 
not evidence. Accordingly, any and all argument by TIMECO ba:, 
on th.at patent is improper, unsupportable and misdirected, I: 
should not be considered by this Court because it is based~ 
evidence not of record" 
Resistance to Royalty Payments 
TIMECO accuses Davis and Walker Bank of making var;: 
misleading statements to the effect that TIMECO has dernonsw: 
a position of resisting royalty payments" Reply Brief, page 
1, lines 1-10" On page 2, lines 1 and 2, of its Reply Brief, 
TUIECO flatly admits th.at it resisted royalty payments. Tl\E 
accusation is th.us groundless. 
Th.e December 22, 1976 
Hearing 
TIMECO now maintains th.at it ob.jected to continua;.: 
of any proceedings after th..e court reporter departed. Indee; 
TIMECO asserts th.at the statement of Davis and Walker Bank t: 
th.e contrary is "false". The transcript of those proceedir< 
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---
shows no objection being voiced by TI~ffiCO. The minute entry 
(R-726) shows no such objection. The record is devoid of any 
such objection (R-726-754), Any such objection was not presented 
in TIME CO' s Motion For Review And Withdrawal of January 31, 19 77 
(R-755). Counsel for Davis and Walker Bank recall no such 
objection, In other words, TIMECO asserts the existence of 
such an objection without any foundation therefore in the record, 
Accordingly, it should be disregarded by this Court, 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons as set forth in the Brief of the 
Defendants-respondents Davis and Walker Bank of August 19, 1977 
and for the additional reasons as herein set forth, this Court 
is urged to dismiss this Appeal or in the alternative to affirm 
the trial court, 
Respectfully submitted, 
- 7-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Th.is is to certify that true and correct copies of 
the foregoing RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF BY DEFC:;D:\.\T~. 
RESPONDENTS CAROL BRIMHALL DAVIS AND WALKER BAN'K were hand de-
livered on the ;1~~ay of Novemher, 1977, as follows: 
(a) Two copies to Philip A, Mallinckrodt, ~lallinckro 
& Mallinckrodt, 10 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah, 8Hll: 
(b) Two copies to A, Wally Sanda ck, Sandack & Sanda· 
370 East Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111; 
(c) Original and nine copies to the Clerk of The 
Supreme Court of the State of 
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